I Did it! Or at Least that\u27s What they Told me to Say! by Cornel, Kevin Lawrence
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2014
I Did it! Or at Least that's What they Told me to
Say!
Kevin Lawrence Cornel
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Cornel, Kevin Lawrence, "I Did it! Or at Least that's What they Told me to Say!" (2014). Law School Student Scholarship. 630.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/630
 2 
I DID IT! OR AT LEAST THAT’S WHAT THEY TOLD ME TO SAY! 
Kevin Cornel 
Seton Hall University School of Law 
      Abstract 
This article seeks to demonstrate that while torture or physical coercion may be an obvious 
cause of an involuntary confession, psychological-coercive techniques can be just effective at 
eliciting an involuntary and thus unreliable confession. Through the use of false confession 
experts, defendants are able to demonstrate to juries that false confessions do exist and that they 
can be the product of psychological interrogation techniques. By highlighting the history of the 
Supreme Court case Miranda v. Arizona, discussing the research done on the area of false 
confession experts, and discussing cases in which false confession experts were allowed to testify 
in, I hope to show that there is a need for such an expert and that they should be admitted into a 
trial to testify. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 “A confession, if freely and voluntarily made, is evidence of the most satisfactory 
character.”1 The evidentiary value of a confession cannot be stressed enough at is undoubtedly 
one of the most damning pieces of evidence that can be used against someone in a trial. The most 
important words in the above quote are “freely and voluntary” and goes to the heart of the Fifth 
Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination.2 However, an involuntary confession 
obtained through coercive measures can have just as much of a damaging effect as one that is 
freely and voluntarily made if not excluded or discredited. Furthermore such a confession is at 
                                                        
1 Hopt v. People, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884). 
2 U.S. Const. amend. V (nor shall [a person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself). 
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odds with the American accusatorial system of law.3 The coercive measures used by authorities 
to obtain such incriminating states are not limited to physical tactics, but psychological as well 
and the Supreme Court is not blind to that fact as evidenced by its language in Blackburn v. State 
of Alabama in which it stated “this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as 
physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional 
inquisition.”4 Due to the impact a confession obtained through the use of psychological-coercive 
tactics can have, purported experts have appeared on the subject of false confessions.5  
 This article explores what false confession experts are and why they are needed in a trial 
in which a defendant claims to have been the subject of psychological coercive tactics. 
Defendants in such a case see to have their admissions and/or incriminating statements deemed 
inadmissible or at least attacked as reliability. While people many readily believe that admissions 
could be coerced by physical means, others are skeptical of how dangerous involuntary 
confessions are to society, how egregious such tactics actually are, and call into question the 
admission of false confession experts.6 However, such experts “may be able to show that 
commonly accepted explanations for [false confessions] are, when studied more closely, 
                                                        
3 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961) (Justice Frankfurter stating that an involuntary 
confession offends the underlying principles in the enforcement of U.S. criminal law). 
4 Blackburn v. State of Ala., 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960). 
5 See Nadia Soree, When the Innocent Speak: False Confessions, Constitutional Safeguards, and 
the Role of Expert Testimony, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191 (2005); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. 
Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of 
Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998); 
Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A Response to Paul 
Cassell’s “Balanced Approach” to the False Confession Problem, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1135 
(1997); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: Another 
Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557 (1998). 
6 See Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions-And 
From Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998); Paul G. Cassel, Balanced 
Approaches to the False Confession Problem: A Brief Comment on Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler, 
74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1123 (1997). 
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inaccurate.”7 
 Part II discusses the history of the Supreme Court case Miranda v. Arizona8 to shed light 
on the problems the Court was attempting to prevent. As mentioned above, the Court has voiced 
its concerns over the admission of involuntary confessions and that it stands at opposite ends of 
our accusatorial system of law. 9 The motive and purpose of false confession experts can be 
shown the dicta and holdings of pre-Miranda jurisprudence. 
 Part III discusses the role of expert witness and the requirements they must meet in order 
to be admitted to testify in trial. By calling on their expertise and knowledge, an expert must 
ultimately be able to assist the trier of fact; otherwise, there would be no need to admit the 
experts in.10 This paper argues that by attacking the commonly accepted thoughts of how 
involuntary confessions are made, i.e. torture, that false confession experts can assist the trier of 
fact. 
 Part IV explains what a false confession expert is and some of the research of 
psychologists in the field. It also discusses the various psychological techniques that false 
confession experts have found to be correlated with false confessions as well as the methods the 
experts use to analyze false confessions. Part IV also discusses the argument critics have of false 
confession experts and why their admission into a trial might be inappropriate.  
                                                        
7 United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ill. 1997) aff'd, 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999). 
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
9 Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540. 
10 U.S. v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 132 (1995) (stating that if a untrained layperson could reach the 
same conclusion using their own knowledge, then an expert is not necessary to assist the trier of 
fact). 
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 Part V analyzes the admission of false confession experts through the facts of 7th Circuit 
and Central District of Illinois cases.11 These cases, which consist of an appeal and remand of the 
same case, layout the ideal scenario for a false confession expert to be admitted into to testify.12 
Also included in this section are a few cases in which false confession experts were denied and 
why there were not admitted into trial. 
 Part VI concludes, and summarizes the role of the false confession expert and what 
problems need to be addressed to better ensure that they are admitted into a trial. Ultimately the 
question comes down to, “will a false confession expert assist a trier of fact?” Based on the 
content of this paper and the materials cited herein, there is a strong argument for their 
admission. 
II. UNRELIABILITY OF CONFESSIONS IN PRE-MIRANDA CASES 
Confessions are the most important pieces of evidence that can be used against a 
defendant in any trial and because of that, the Supreme Court has worked to establish on what 
grounds admissions should be admitted or not admitted. In light of the consequences admissions 
can have in any trial, experts have come forward and sought admission into trials to testify as to 
whether or not the admissions/statements of defendants were there the results of psychological 
coercion. The purported importance of a false confession expert can be seen in the history of 
Miranda. The Supreme Court has been weary of confessions obtained through coercive tactics 
since they could lead even an innocent man to confess to something he did not do and thus yield 
unreliable confessions.13 The Court has held that it is necessary for courts to look at the 
surrounding circumstances in which a confession was obtained in cases that involve not only 
                                                        
11 See United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996); Hall, 974 F. Supp. at 1198 (C.D. Ill. 
1997) aff'd, 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 585. 
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physical coercion, but psychological because “it is impossible for this Court, in enforcing the 
Fourteenth Amendment, to attempt precisely to delimit, or to surround with specific, all-
inclusive restrictions, the power of interrogation allowed in state law enforcement officers in 
obtaining confessions.”14 Language such as this indicates that the Supreme Court realizes the 
possible dangers inherent in psychological-coercive tactics and that there is not a one-size-fits-all 
analysis in determining whether or not such tactics are enough to cause an involuntary 
confession. 
In 1897, the Supreme Court in Bram v. United States, the Supreme Court used the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution in its analysis of the admissibility of confessions and centered its 
reasoning around the concept of “free and voluntary.”15 The Court looked at the circumstances 
under which the confession was made and found that confession was involuntary and thus 
inadmissible.16 The confession in question was obtained from the defendant while he was alone 
and naked in the interrogators office which led the Court to state “when all the surrounding 
circumstances are considered in their true relations, not only is the claim that the statement was 
voluntary overthrown, but the impression is irresistibly produced that it must necessarily have 
been the result of either hope or fear, or both, operating on the mind.”17 While the tactics used 
were not the most egregious the Court would see interrogators use to obtain confessions,18 this 
case illustrates that the Court appreciated the consequences of psychological tactics. The Court 
extended the protections of the Fifth Amendment to states through the use of the Fourteenth 
                                                        
14 Culomb v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601 (1961). 
15 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 557 (1897). 
16 Id. at 565. 
17 Id. at 562. 
18 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-282 (1964) (holding that the confession obtained 
by the police from defendant were inadmissible because the police interrogators had hung and 
whipped the defendant until he confessed) 
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Amendment.19 The coercive tactics used in this case were not the most egregious the Court 
would encounter.  
In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, the defendant was subjected to a thirty-six hour examination 
with only 5-minute respite.20 During the course of the interrogation, which the police admit 
consisted of a barrage of question in which they accused the defendant of killing his wife, the 
defendant allegedly confessed. There was a dispute in the case over whether or not the defendant 
actually confessed but the Court stated, “if Ashcraft made a confession it was not voluntary but 
compelled.”21 The Court further stated: 
We think a situation such as that here shown by uncontradicted evidence is so 
inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with the possession of 
mental freedom by a lone suspect against whom its full coercive force is brought 
to bear.9 It is inconceivable that any court of justice in the land, conducted as our 
courts are, open to the public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays to keep 
a defendant witness under continuous cross examination for thirty-six hours 
without rest or sleep in an effort to extract a ‘voluntary’ confession. Nor can we, 
consistently with Constitutional due process of law, hold voluntary a confession 
where prosecutors do the same thing away from the restraining influences of a 
public trial in an open court room22 
 
The Court noted the defendant’s mental state showing it appreciated the effects of nonphysical-
coercive tactics and held any alleged confession was inadmissible and remanded the case. 
In 1949, the Court again addressed a situation in which nonphysical coercive tactics were 
used to elicit incriminating statements from a defendant.23 In Watts v. State of Indiana, the 
defendant was subjected to five night interrogations, which began at 6 pm and continued until the 
3 am the following morning.24 The defendant was also confined to a cell called “the hole” denied 
                                                        
19 Malloy v Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) 
20 Ashcraft v. State of Tenn., 322 U.S. 143, 151-152 (1944). 
21 Id. at 153. 
22 Id. at 154. 
23 Watts v. State of Ind., 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949). 
24 Id. at 53. 
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a “decent food allowance.”25 In his opinion, Justice Frankfurter stated “when a suspect speaks 
because he is overborne, it is immaterial whether he has been subjected to a physical or a mental 
ordeal” and that use such tactics implied to the defendant that it was better for him to comply 
than to refuse disclosing information “which is his constitutional right.”26 
In following with this line of cases, the Court was called to address yet another situation 
in which a defendant was subjected to a possibly more overbearing form of psychological 
coercion than that of the defendant in the previous cases mentioned.27 In Spano, after shooting a 
man who beat him, defendant called and informed his “friend,” a fledging police officer, about 
what happened.28 Defendant subsequently turned himself into the police and was interrogated for 
eight hours despite telling the authorities that he would not speak without his lawyer present.29 
During the interrogation, the police used the defendant’s friend to play on his emotions by 
having this “friend” tell the defendant that his “call had gotten him into trouble, that his job was 
in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his 
unborn child.”30 These along “official pressure [and] fatigue” from the late into early morning 
interrogation were held to have overcome defendant’s will and thus, the admission was deemed 
inadmissible.31 The Court reasoned it’s holding on many notions, including the notion that 
involuntary confessions are inherently untrustworthy. 32 It also took note that the methods used 
                                                        
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 54. 
27 Spano v New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959). 
28 Id. at 317. 
29 Id. at 322. 
30 Id. at 323. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 320. 
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to extract information from suspects have become “sophisticated” and that the Court’s judgment 
must be based on the surrounding facts to “enforce federal constitutional protections.”33 
It is important to note that while the Court voiced its concern that involuntary confessions 
could yield unreliable confessions, it also stated that “convictions following the admission into 
evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the product of [physical or psychological 
coercion], cannot stand. This is not so because the confessions are unlikely to be true but because 
the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle [that our criminal law is 
accusatorial system not an inquisitorial system].”34 According to some, in the cases prior to 
Miranda, one of the Court’s major concerns with involuntary confessions dealt with the 
unreliability of those said confessions.35 
In 1966, the Court released it decision on Miranda v. Arizona, a case of great significance 
in American law.36 Using the Fifth Amendment, the Court held that the incriminating statements 
made by defendants were inadmissible, relying heavily on the fact that the defendants were not 
read their rights prior to being interrogated since the record did not “evince overt physical 
coercion or patent psychological ploys.”37 The Court did however take note that the “modern 
practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented” but is 
“equally destructive of human dignity.”38  
                                                        
33 Id. at 321. 
34 Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540. 
35 M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 12 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 336 (2003) (citing Steven Penney, Theories of Confession 
Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 310,  313 (1998)). 
36 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436 (1966) (This opinion is a combination of four cases in which four 
defendants were subjected to “incommunicado interrogation … in a police-dominated 
atmosphere, [that resulted] in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of 
constitutional rights”). 
37 Miranda, 348 U.S. at 457. 
38 Id. at 458. 
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While the Court may not have touched on the unreliableness involuntary confessions may 
possess in its later cases, the history of Miranda shows that it was very much a concern to the 
Court and thus in a sense validates the motivation of false confession experts to testify on behalf 
of defendants, to show that psychological coercive techniques could cause defendants to 
involuntarily confess. If the Supreme Court can appreciate the dangers of psychological 
interrogation techniques, then the general public should be on alert that such a thing as 
psychological-coerced involuntary confession exisits. Despite availability of the Supreme 
Court’s cases and language, the public might not be aware and thus the need for a false 
confession expert is made apparent. However, before a false confession expert can testify, he or 
she must meet the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
III. RULE 702 AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
 Before an expert is allowed to testify, the expert must meet the standards of Rule 702 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as the supplemental Supreme Court cases that further 
explain the requirements of that rule.39 In Daubert, the Supreme Court dismissed the “general 
acceptance” test of Frye for determining the admissibility of expert testimony and instead stated 
that that the Frye test was “superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”40 Prior 
to the application of Rule 702, a judge must determine whether the expert is testifying to 
scientific knowledge and whether it “will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact 
in issue.”41 Factors to consider in making such a determination are whether the scientific theory 
or technique is or can be tested, whether the theory has been subjected to peer review, the rate of 
error associated with theory/technique, and whether there is widespread acceptance of the 
                                                        
39 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Kumho Tire Co., 
Ltd. V. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
40 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 586. 
41 Id. at 592 (citing Fed. R. Evid.104). 
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technique/theory.42 If an untrained layperson could, without the help of an expert, intelligently 
determine to the best degree the fact in issue, then the expert’s testimony will not be deemed 
admissible since it is unnecessary to assist the trier of fact.43 After this initial inquiry, the judge 
then applies Rule 702, which states: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 
case.44 
 
Using Rule 702, it is a judge’s job to ensure that all expert testimony admitted it relevant and 
reliable.45 “The subject of the testimony must be ‘scientific … knowledge.”46 Scientific meaning 
that the method used by the professor is grounded in science and knowledge meaning more than 
a personal belief, but knowledge does not mean that the testimony be known with 100% 
certainty.47 As the Court noted, “arguably, there are no certainties in science.”48 Furthermore, the 
testimony must “fit” the facts of the case and thus “requires a valid scientific connection to the 
pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.”49  
Shortly after the decision in Daubert, the Supreme Court expanded a judge’s 
“gatekeeping” obligation by requiring a relevancy and reliability inquiry into all expert 
testimony, including testimony that is technical or specialized in nature, not just scientific 
                                                        
42 Id. at 593-594. 
43 Shay, 57 F.3d at 132 (1995). 
44 Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
45 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
46 Id. at 590. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 591. 
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testimony.50 The ultimate determination by a trial judge of whether or not admit expert testimony 
is subject to an abuse of discretion standard.51 
IV: THE FALSE CONFESSION EXPERT 
The admissibility of false confession experts varies, as the Supreme Court has not ruled 
on the admissibility of said experts.52 In the jurisdictions that have allowed them, what the 
experts are allowed to testify to also varies.53 An observer of false confession experts categorizes 
experts three (3) groups: “a psychiatrist/clinical psychologist who has examined the particular 
makeup of [a] defendant (medical model), a clinical psychologist/social scientist who has 
examined the techniques used by police in obtaining the confession (social science model), or a 
combination of both.”54 A typically people falsely confesses for three reasons according to 
experts.55 The person either voluntarily confesses despite not being coerced, a person confesses 
due to psychological coercion so it will end, or because the person ends up believing he or she is 
guilty due to the effects of the psychological coercion.56 
To test the theory of false confessions, a pair of psychologists did an experiment to see if 
they could get people to confess to something they did not do.57 The test involved getting college 
students to type what they were told on computers.58 The psychologists leading the experiment 
                                                        
50 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 137. 
51 General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 552 U.S. 136, 141 (1997). 
52 David A. Perez, Comment: The (In)Admissibility of False Confession Expert Testimony, 26 
TOURO L. REV. 23, 36 (2010).  
53 See United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996); Hall, 974 F. Supp. at 1198 (C.D. Ill. 
1997) aff'd, 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 
2001); United States v. Mamah, 332 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2003). 
54 Soree, supra note 5, at 227. 
55 Id. at 196. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 197-198 (citing Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Keichel, The Social Psychology of False 
Confessions: Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125 (1996)). 
58 Id. 
 13 
told the students not to hit the ALT key otherwise the computer would crash.59 Unknown the 
college students, the computers were forced to crash even though the students did not hit the 
ALT key.60 The students were confronted by people leading the experiment and were accused to 
hitting the key.61 The results of the experiment showed that sixty-nine percent (69%) signed a 
confession stating that they hit the key, twenty-eight percent (28%) actually believed they hit the 
key, and nine percent (9%) made up facts that supported the accusation.62 
While such an accusation and the form of psychological coercive techniques used here 
are as benign as possible, the study showed that people could be convinced to confess despite 
being educated. What’s more impressive if that it also demonstrated that some of the students 
were actually led to believe that they had in fact hit the ALT key and that some went even further 
and made up supporting facts. If someone could be convinced by the mildest form psychology 
coercion, imagine what someone could be convinced or coerced into saying by trained 
investigators.   
False confessions in an interrogation setting occur “when a suspect’s resistance to 
confession is broken down as a result of poor police practice, overzealousness, criminal 
misconduct, and/or misdirected training.”63 Some of the techniques investigators use to coerce 
confessions from suspects are: “misrepresenting the factual gravity” of the alleged crime, 
“lull[ing] suspects into a false sense of security,” “role-playing to appeal to the suspect’s 
conscience,” “downplaying the moral seriousness” of the alleged crime, suggesting the victim is 
                                                        
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Richard A. Leo & Richard J Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of 
Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, supra note 5 at 
440. 
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responsible for their fate, and vague and implied promises.64 Also, according to Soree, the two 
most “blatantly deceptive” techniques police use are misrepresenting their identity and 
fabricating evidence.65 These types of techniques bring to mind the pre-Miranda cases in which 
the Supreme Court found confessions obtained by such techniques to be involuntary and possibly 
unreliable.66 
Although there is not precise number of how many false confessions occur in the United 
States, false confession experts have developed methods to analyze the interrogations of suspects 
in cases in which the suspects were ultimately found innocent after providing a false 
confession.67 In their study, Leo & Ofshe analyzed sixty (60) cases with the common 
characteristic that they centered around an individual being arrested primarily because police 
obtained an inculpatory statement that later turned out to be a proven, or highly likely, false 
confession.”68 It is important to note that these cases are not representative of cases generally in 
the United States because they were selected based on their common characteristic.69 Also, out of 
the cases chosen, only thirty-four (34) were actually proven false confessions.70 This 
demonstrates that the occurrence of innocent false confessions being obtained via psychological 
                                                        
64 Soree, supra note 5, at 199-200. 
65 Id. (stating various forms of fabricated evidence include accomplice identification, fake 
fingerprints and/or blood samples, nonexistent eyewitnesses, false polygraph tests, and staged 
lineups). 
66 See Spano v New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
67 Richard A. Leo & Richard J Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of 
Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, supra note 5 at 
431, 433 (Leo & Ofshe report that the reason there is not proximate number of false confessions 
because “(1) no organization collects statistics on the annual number of interrogations and 
confessions or evaluates the reliability of confession statements; (2) most interrogations leading 
to disputed confessions are not recorded; and (3) the ground truth (what really happened) may 
remain in genuine dispute even after a defendant has pled guilty or been convicted). 
68 Id. at 436. 
69 Id. (stating that the cases “do not constitute a statistically adequate sample of false confession 
cases). 
70 Id. 
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coercive tactics might be incredibly unlikely. The proven false confessions in the study fell into 
four (4) categories: the confessor confessed to something that did not happen; the evidence 
shows the confessor could not have committed the alleged crime; the real criminal was found 
and his guilt determined; or the confessor was exonerated by scientific evidence.71 To analyze 
the cases, Leo & Ofshe used the “post-admission narrative analysis” which looks for “a fit-or 
lack thereof- between the contents of the narrative and the crime scene facts.”72 If there’s a 
match then the confessor probably committed the crime. If there are a lot of discrepancies, then 
the confessor is probably innocent.73 
After publication of Leo & Ofshe’s research, it was subjected to peer review and called 
into question. One of the major criticisms is over how Leo & Ofshe obtained the cases to 
analyze.74 In his article in response to Leo & Ofshe, Cassell states that the actual number false 
confessions is incredibly small and represents only a small fraction of actual convictions 
countrywide.75 In doing his own research on the issue, Cassell interviewed a judge in Ohio and 
asked him how many wrongful convictions he thought occurred in the state of Ohio.76 He 
subsequently generalized it for the United States as a whole and came up with a total of 330 
wrongful convictions are year, 29 of which are attributable to false confessions. Cassell 
calculated this to be about 0.006%.77 He uses this small number to show that “the screens in the 
system have … worked to prevent the ultimate miscarriage of justice: the conviction of innocent 
                                                        
71 Id. at 499. 
72 Id. at 438. 
73 Id. 
74 Cassell, supra note 6, at 500. 
75 Id. at 517-518. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 518. 
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[people].”78 He further uses this number to demonstrate that researchers of false confessions, 
specifically those that voice the dangers of coercive interrogation techniques, are screaming fire 
when there is no fire and that by doing so researchers such as Leo & Ofshe are actually hurting 
innocent people.79 Cassell states, “The innocent are at risk not only when police extract 
untruthful confessions-the false confession problem-but also when police fail to obtain truthful 
confessions from criminals-the lost confession problem.”80 Cassell claims the legal system has 
adequate screens to deal with confessions that are involuntary and that false confession experts 
creating a problem from nothing and preventing police from using techniques that actually work, 
techniques that obtain confessions from the true perpetrator.81 “The failure to obtain a confession 
from the real perpetrator can deny evidence needed to prevent a wrongful conviction or to 
exonerate an innocent person who has already been wrongfully convicted.”82 This type of logic 
is flawed in that what it seems like he’s saying is that police should be able to correct a mistake 
they made by using psychological techniques they possibly used on an innocent person to obtain 
a confession from possibly the real perpetrator.  
Following the publication and release of Cassell’s paper, the peer review process 
continued with Leo & Ofshe’s response. Leo & Ofshe responded to Cassell’s attack of their 
cherry-picking of cases by stating the problem with reporting and analyzing false confession 
cases, mainly that they’re hard to find because police interrogations are not typically recorded, 
“statistics on the number or frequency of interrogations in America,” and that “many cases of 
false confession[s] are likely to go entirely unreported and therefore unacknowledged and 
                                                        
78 Id. at 504. 
79 Id. at 498. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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unnoticed.”83 They also attacked Cassell’s downplaying of the number false confessions by 
attacking his calculation of false confession convictions on the opinion of a judge in Ohio.84 
They claim that using the state of Ohio to represent all of America made no sense.85 Leo & 
Ofshe also stated that even if the “screens” do prevent an innocent confessor from being 
convicted, they still suffer harms. Harms such as “wrongful (and sometimes lengthy) pretrial 
deprivation of liberty, the stigma associated with criminal charges, the irrevocable loss of 
reputation, the stress of standing trial and the sometimes bankrupting financial burdens of 
defending oneself in costly and drawn out proceedings.”86 Leo & Ofshe’s listing of the harms 
associated with false confessions support the notion that false confession experts are needed and 
should be admitted in applicable trials. Even if the numbers of cases of wrongful convictions due 
to involuntary confessions are low, the harms can be tremendous as illustrated above.  
As discussed in the next section, the analysis and research used by Leo & Ofshe can meet 
the standards announced in Daubert and comply with Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of evidence. 
The tests are observational and are used on actual cases of false confessions to help create a link 
between the techniques used by interrogators, all psychological, and false confessions. Also, the 
back and forth between Leo/Ofshe and Cassell demonstrates that the field is subject to peer 
review, something that judges take into account to determine if an expert is qualified to testify in 
trial. It is important to remember too that false confessions can be admitted into a trial because 
                                                        
83 Richard A. Leo & Richard J Ofshe, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A Response to Paul 
Cassel’s “Balanced Approach” to The False Confession Problem, supra note 5 at 1137. 
84 Richard A. Leo & Richard J Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: Another Reply 
to Paul Cassell, supra note 5 at 570-571. 
85 Id. at 571. 
86 Id. at 564. 
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the test, as announced by the Supreme Court, on the admissibility of confessions is whether they 
are voluntary not on their reliability.87  
V: THE MODEL OF ADMISSIBILITY OF FALSE CONFESSION EXPERTS VIA 
HALL AND CASES OF EXCLUSION 
In a series of cases bouncing between the 7th Circuit and the Central District of Illinois, a 
false confession expert in U.S. v Hall was found to have met the requirements of Daubert.88 The 
defendant (Hall) in this series of cases was convicted for the kidnapping and murder of a girl in 
1993.89 As part of its case, the prosecution introduced a confession obtained by the defendant to 
the murder of the girl.90 In the district court, the defendant sought to have an expert on false 
confessions, a form of social science grounded in social psychology, as well as a psychiatrist 
admitted to testify as to the reliability of the confession to show that it was false.91 The district 
court allowed the psychiatrist to “testify about Hall’s mental condition (e.g. his attention-seeking 
behavior and his high level of suggestibility) and to opine that one of the problems for someone 
interrogating [defendant] … was that [defendant] could easily be led to give the type of response 
[defendant] believed the questioner was seeking.”92 The court excluded the false confession 
expert and prevented the psychiatrist from testifying specifically about defendant’s susceptibility 
                                                        
87 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (Court stated “convictions following the 
admission into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the product of [physical or 
psychological coercion], cannot stand. This is not so because the confessions are unlikely to be 
true but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle [that our 
criminal law is accusatorial system not an inquisitorial system].”) 
88 Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1102-1126 aff’d 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999). 
89 Hall, 93 F.3d at 1341. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
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to some interrogation techniques and defendant’s “capability of confessing to a crime he did not 
commit,” reasoning that such testimony would invade the role of the jury.93  
On appeal, the 7th circuit found that the district court had failed to properly apply Daubert 
in its exclusion of false confession expert Dr. Richard Ofshe.94 The appellate court found that 
social sciences were important parts to several types of litigation, that the rules of evidence 
should be applied to them, and that since the field of social sciences qualified for expert 
testimony, the district court must determine that the testimony being offered was based on the 
expert’s particular skillset.95 It thus stated that “experts in psychiatry and psychology can meet 
both these hurdles: real science, and testimony,” that there was “no categorical reason to exclude 
expert testimony that bears on truthfulness in the Federal Rules of Evidence,” and that the 
Federal Rules of Evidence instead “contemplate that truthful or untruthful character may be 
proven by expert testimony.”96 Thus, expert testimony can in some cases overlap with the role 
assigned to the jury if it will assist the jury. It cannot replicate the jury’s knowledge and cannot 
unduly influence the jury’s ultimate decision. 97 
The appellate court ended its decision by stating that when the district held that the 
proffered testimony of the expert was not useful because the jury was capable of making the 
some conclusions based on their knowledge, the district court “missed the point.”98 “Even 
though the jury may have had beliefs about the subject, the question is whether those beliefs 
were correct. Properly conducted social science research often shows that commonly held beliefs 
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94 Id. at 1346. 
95 Id. at 1342-43. 
96 Id. at 1343. 
97 Id. at 1344. 
98 Id. at 1345. 
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are in error.”99 The proffered testimony would have informed the jury that such a thing as false 
confessions does exist, what its identifying characteristics are, and “how to decide whether [the 
theory] fit the facts of the case being tried.”100 
Hall Remanded 
On remand, the district court applied the Daubert factors (“falsifiability, peer review, rate 
of error and general acceptance) in determining the admissibility of defendant Hall’s proffered 
false confession expert.101 In its analysis, it further noted that when applying Daubert, the four 
factors would be applied in differing degrees when applied to social sciences than how they are 
applied to scientific based testimony. “The only thing that remains constant for all forms of 
expert testimony is that there must be some degree of reliability of the expert and the methods by 
which he has arrived at his conclusions.”102  
In any field of social science, an expert should have to testify, at a minimum, to 
the longevity of that particular field, the amount of literature written about the 
subject, the methods of peer review among its scholarly journals, the quantity of 
observational or other studies conducted in that field, the comparative similarity 
of observations obtained, the reasons why those studies are deemed valid and 
reliable, and the general consensus or debate as to what the raw data means. In 
addition, the particular expert who wishes to testify must establish that he is 
sufficiently familiar with the topics mentioned above to render an informed 
opinion about them. It would also be helpful, but not necessary, to show that the 
proposed expert personally contributed to the field about which he is testifying, 
either through personal observation or by publication of an article, book or 
treatise on the subject.103 
                                                        
99 Id. 
100 Id. (Leo & Ofshe state “there are at least three indicia of reliability that can be evaluated to 
reach a conclusion about the trustworthiness of a confession. Does the statement: (1) lead to the 
discovery of evidence unknown to the police? …; (2) include identification of highly unusual 
elements of the crime that have not been made public? …; or (3) include an accurate description 
of the mundane details of the crime scene which are not easily guessed and have not been 
reported publicly?). 
101 Hall, 974 F.Supp. at 1200-1206 aff’d 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999). 
102 Id. at 1202. 
103 Id. 
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The district court found that the false confession expert, Dr. Ofshe, had a doctorate degree in 
social psychology from Stanford University and had taught psychological methods.104  He was 
also found to have been apart of numerous peer reviews on articles dealing with sociology and 
social psychology and had served editorial boards for such topics.105 The court also found that 
throughout his long academic career, he had researched the issue of influence on decision-
making, had written several articles on the subject, evaluated 126 interrogations, and testified on 
the subject of influence on interrogations in at least 68 state and federal trials.106  
 After investigating his background and continuing with the Daubert analysis, the court, in 
the Rule 104(a) hearing, heard about the field of false confessions within the social psychology 
field from Dr. Ofshe.107 He stated that it was a mix of sociology and psychology, presented 
numerous articles and presentations on coerced confessions, and stated “there is no dispute in the 
scientific community that false confessions do exist.”108 During the hearing, Ofshe explained that 
the study of false confessions is based on systematic observations of actual documented 
interrogations of innocent people who had confessed to a crime.109 The court noted that “[t]his is 
a method generally accepted as reliable by the community of social psychologists.”110 Ofshe then 
stated that the generally accepted/used analytical method for determining whether or not a 
confession is false, is through “post-admission narrative statement.”111 This method involves 
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comparing what the confessor reveals about the details of the crime.112 If what the confessor 
matches the actual details, then he is probably guilty. If what the confessor said is inconsistent 
with the actual details of the crime, he is probably falsely confessing.113 Again, it is important to 
note that this form of analysis is different from a scientific-experimental model in that it’s based 
on observations and systematic analysis and does not involve the manipulation of variables.114 
 Once it has been determined that there is a false confession, “the research analyzes the 
interrogation process, either by reviewing it on audio or videotape or by having the parties recall 
the details of the interrogation” to look for factors that are correlated with the presence of false 
confessions.115 “Dr. Ofshe testified that no one factor or combination of factors could guarantee a 
false confession but that some factors might heighten the likelihood of one.”116 One of the most 
important factors associated with false confessions is interrogators use of consistent false 
accusations and/or false promises. 117 
 Ofshe admitted that the “low-level experimentations conducted in the field alone are not 
sufficiently reliable to support his findings” but that the psychologist community subjects the 
studies, prior to publication, to peer review.118 Furthermore, after his elaboration on the field and 
techniques used to study the phenomena of false confessions stated the methods used were 
proper for analyzing whether and why they happen.119 
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118 Id. (Dr. Ofshe states that authors of studies on false confessions typically respond to the 
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 The court ultimately found that Ofshe was a qualified expert in false confessions and 
allowed him to testify.120 However, Ofshe opted not to give an ultimate opinion on whether or 
not the defendant in this case was actually coerced, instead he decided to only discuss the 
existence of false confessions and the factors that have been correlated with false confessions.  
Cases of Exclusion 
 While some courts like the one Hall have allowed the testimony of false confession 
experts, others have not. In U.S. v Mamah, the court was not satisfied facts developed from the 
expert witnesses, one of them Ofshe, seeking permission.121 This case was in the 7th Circuit, the 
same that allowed Ofshe in to testify in Hall. The court stated,  “The problem with the proposed 
testimony in this case does not lie in the quality of [the expert’s] research. Rather the problem is 
the absence of an empirical link between that research and the opinion that [defendant] likely 
gave a false confession.”122 Ofshe would have been permitted to testify had he been able to 
connect his research to the defendant without a showing that defendant was susceptible to 
interrogation.123 “Had Dr. Ofshe been able to testify that an individual who, like [defendant], is 
subjected to coercive interrogation tactics on one occasion will give a false confession on a 
second occasion when he is not subjected to coercive interrogation tactics, then perhaps his 
proffered testimony would have survived Rule 702.”124 
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121 Mamah, 332 F.3d at 478. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
 24 
 Also, in a factually different case than that of Hall, defendant sought to have a false 
confession expert testify as to the reliability of his confession.125 He claimed that he had lied to 
the police to protect his girlfriend and thus incriminated himself.126 The court found that such 
information was “precisely the type of explanation that a jury is capable of resolving without 
expert testimony.”127 The court distinguished it from Hall by stating that defendant was not 
claiming to have susceptible to coercive tactics or claim that the tactics in any way coerced him. 
Therefore no expert was needed, as he or she would not have been able to assist the trier of 
fact.128 
 The psychology field, specifically the part dealing with false confessions has released 
publications explaining their method for analyzing the phenomenon and finds of their research. 
It’s also being subjected to peer review, which helps researchers in the field further refine their 
opinions and results of their observations. The biggest obstacle for a false confession expert does 
not appear to be from their qualifications or doubts about the field itself, but from the defendants 
themselves and how well their situations are applied to the results of the experts’ tests. 
 Based on these two cases and the Hall decisions, if a defendant wants a false confession 
expert in to testify, he must show that their research somehow links to their research. The 
defendant cannot simply allege that they intentionally lied. Such an example is not a situation of 
an involuntary confession obtained through psychological coercive tactics. It is an example of a 
voluntary confession made under their own volition for their own personal reason. Examples of 
the types of interrogation techniques correlated with false confessions and/or a demonstration 
that the defendant is susceptible to influence should be alleged. Without such an allegation, a 
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court is likely to find that a layperson, using his or her own knowledge, is able to reach the reach 
the same conclusion as the expert. As stated, the ultimate question that a judge asks when 
determining the admissibility of an expert witness is if the expert’s testimony is not too 
prejudicial and will assist the trier of fact.129 A recommendation drawn from the above-cited 
cases is that the expert should testify only to the fact that false confessions occur and that their 
research, based on observational studies, has shown that certain interrogation techniques have 
been correlated with false involuntary confessions.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The occurrence of false confessions may be hard to estimate, but they do occur and the 
damage to the false confessor is very real. The research of false confession experts have revealed 
that certain interrogation techniques have been linked involuntary and false confessions. As 
noted above, the effects of a false confession can economic, psychological, and societal 
effects.130 Through pre-Miranda cases, the Supreme Court has been a witness to the evolution of 
interrogation. Interrogators no longer use physical means to obtain information, incriminating 
statements, and/or confessions. They have developed and use techniques that bear on the mind of 
the individual are likely to elicit responses if applied with enough pressure and consistency.131 
The testimony of false confession experts stands for something more than just attacking the 
                                                        
129 Shay, 57 F.3d at 132 (stating that if a untrained layperson could reach the same conclusion 
using their own knowledge, then an expert is not necessary to assist the trier of fact). 
130 Richard A. Leo & Richard J Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: Another Reply 
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reliability of confessions, but also the protection of an accused’s Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination. 
 An overlooked and important part of a false confession case is the individual. In Reilly v. 
State, a boy was convicted of brutally killing his mother.132 There was no physical evidence 
tying him to the scene and he had witnesses who testified that he was somewhere else when the 
murder was committed.133 The boy came home to find is mother’s body and proceeded to call for 
help.134 When the authorities arrived they took him in for questioning and interrogated him about 
the murder of his mother.135 The police subjected him to a polygraph test during which he 
confessed to having killed his mother despite the fact that his alibi matched up and that there was 
no physical evidence linking him to the murder.136 Why would someone do that? The boy sought 
to have expert testimony introduced to testify that he was the type of person to be susceptible to 
confess during an interrogation and the state fought to have him excluded.137 The superior court 
of Connecticut ultimately remanded the case for a new trial and stated that the expert should be 
admitted and that “[t]he confessions and admissions went totally unexplained except in the 
testimony of the plaintiff himself.”138 
 It is easy to lose sight of the person for the issues involved. Imagine being convicted and 
blamed for the murder of your mother because you were unable to be confused by an assertion 
and accept it as fact through no fault of your own. The danger of false confessions is there and 
the people who are the subject of psychological coercive techniques are real. The field of false 
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confessions is established and populated by qualified individuals who publish their research and 
subject it to peer review. The studies have provided results that some courts have found to be 
credible and thus ultimately allow the admission of these experts. False confession experts have 
been and should continue to be admitted into trials. The paper argues that these experts meet the 
requirements of Daubert and Rule 702 and should thus be permitted when their admissions 
conform with the other applicable Federal Rules of Evidence.  
